[물질과 기억 독해] 60~63

C'est dire que le système nerveux n'a rien d'un appareil qui servirait à fabriquer ou même à préparer des représentations. Il a pour fonction de recevoir des excitations, de monter des appareils moteurs, et de présenter le plus grand nombre possible de ces appareils à une excitation donnée. Plus il se développe, plus nombreux et plus éloignés deviennent les points de l'espace qu'il met en rapport avec des mécanismes moteurs toujours plus complexes : ainsi grandit la latitude qu'il laisse à notre action, et en cela consiste justement sa perfection croissante. Mais si le système nerveux est construit, d'un bout à l'autre de la série animale, en vue d'une action de moins en moins nécessaire, ne faut-il pas penser que la perception, dont le progrès se règle sur le sien, est tout entière orientée, elle aussi, vers l'action, non vers la connaissance pure ? Et dès lors la richesse croissante de cette perception elle-même ne doit-elle pas symboliser simplement la part croissante d'indétermination laissée au choix de l'être vivant dans sa conduite vis-à-vis des choses ? Partons donc de cette indétermination comme du principe véritable. Cherchons, une fois cette indétermination posée, si l'on ne pourrait pas en déduire la possibilité et même la nécessité de la perception consciente. En d'autres termes, donnons-nous ce système d'images solidaires et bien liées qu'on appelle le monde matériel, et imaginons çà et là, dans ce système, des centres d'action réelle représentés par la matière vivante : je dis qu'il faut qu'autour de chacun de ces centres se disposent des images subordonnées à sa position et variables avec elle ; je dis par conséquent que la perception consciente doit se produire, et que, de plus, il est possible de comprendre comment cette perception surgit.

That is to say that the nervous system is in no sense an apparatus which may serve to fabricate, or even to prepare, representations. Its function is to receive stimulation, to provide motor apparatus, (pg 21) and to present the largest possible number of these apparatuses to a given stimulus. The more it develops, the more numerous and the more distant are the points of space which it brings into relation with ever more complex motor mechanisms. In this way the scope which it allows to our action enlarges: its growing perfection consists in nothing else. But if the nervous system is thus constructed, from one end of the animal series to the other, in view of an action which is less and less necessary, must we not think that perception, of which the progress is regulated by that of the nervous system, is also entirely directed towards action, and not towards pure knowledge? And, if this be so, is not the growing richness of this perception likely to symbolize the wider range of indetermination left to the choice of the living being in its conduct with regard to things? Let us start, then, from this indetermination as from the true principle, and try whether we cannot deduce from it the possibility, and even the necessity, of conscious perception. In other words, let us posit that system of closely-linked images which we call the material world, and imagine here and there, within the system, centres o f real action, represented by living matter: what we mean to prove is that there must be, ranged round each one of these centres, images that are subordinated to its position and variable with it; that conscious perception is bound to occur, and that, moreover, it is possible to understand how it arises.

정리
- 신경계는 표상을 만들어내거나 준비하는 데 사용되는 기구가 결코 아니다.
- 그것의 기능은 하나의 주어진 자극에 가능한 한 많은 수의 운동기제들을 제시하는 것이다.
- 신경계가 발달할수록, 공간의 점들은 더욱 더 많아지고, 공간의 점들 사이는 점점 멀어지면서 그 신경계는 더욱 더 복잡한 운동기제들과 관계맺게 된다.
- 그런데 이처럼, 신경계가 발달한다는 것은, 행동이 점점 덜 필연적이 되도록 구성되는 것을 의미하는 것이라면, 신경계의 진보를 따라 진보하는 지각 역시 순수 인식을 향한 것이 아니라, 전적으로 '행동'을 향한 것이라고 생각해서는 안 될까 ?
- 그렇다면 지각이 풍부해진다는 것은, 결국 사물들에 대한 생명체의 행동에 있어서, 그것의 비결정성이 증가한다는 것을 의미한다고 볼 수 있지 않을까 ?
- 그렇다면 이제 이 비결정성을 진정한 원리로 상정한 다음, 거기서부터 '의식적 지각'의 가능성, 그리고 그 '필연성'까지도 도출할 수 있는지 알아보자.

 

Remarquons d'abord qu'une loi rigoureuse relie l'étendue de La perception consciente à l'intensité d'action dont l'être vivant dispose. Si notre hypothèse est fondée, cette perception apparaît au moment précis où un ébranlement reçu par la matière ne se prolonge pas en réaction nécessaire. Dans le cas d'un organisme rudimentaire, il faudra, il est vrai, un contact immédiat de l'objet intéressant pour que l'ébranlement se produise, et alors la réaction ne peut guère se faire attendre. C'est ainsi que, dans les espèces inférieures, le toucher est passif et actif tout à la fois ; il sert à reconnaître une proie et à la saisir, à sentir le danger et à faire effort pour l'éviter. Les prolongements variés des protozoaires, les ambulacres des échinodermes sont des organes de mouve- ment aussi bien que de perception tactile ; l'appareil urticant des cœlentérés est un instrument de perception en même temps qu'un moyen de défense. En un mot, plus la réaction doit être immédiate, plus il faut que la perception ressemble à un simple contact, et le processus complet de perception et de réaction se distingue à peine alors de l'impulsion mécanique suivie d'un mouvement nécessaire. Mais à mesure que la réaction devient plus incertaine, qu'elle laisse plus de place à l'hésitation, à mesure aussi s'accroît la distance à laquelle se fait sentir sur l'animal l'action de l'objet qui l'intéresse. Par la vue, par l'ouïe, il se met en rapport avec un nombre toujours plus grand de choses, il subit des influences de plus en plus lointaines ; et soit que ces objets lui promettent un avantage, soit qu'ils le menacent d'un danger, promesses et menaces reculent leur échéance. La part d'indépendance dont un être vivant dispose, ou, comme nous dirons, la zone d'indétermination qui entoure son activité, permet donc d'évaluer a priori le nombre et l'éloignement des choses avec lesquelles il est en rapport. Quel que soit ce rapport, quelle que soit donc la nature intime de la perception, on peut affirmer que l'amplitude de la per- ception mesure exactement l'indétermination de l'action consécutive, et par conséquent énoncer cette loi : la perception dispose de l'espace dans l'exacte proportion où l'action dispose du temps.

We note, in the first place, that a strict law connects the amount of conscious perception with the intensity of action at the disposal of the living being. If our hypothesis is well founded, this perception appears at the precise moment when a stimulation received by matter is not prolonged into a necessary action. In the case of a rudimentary organism, it is true that immediate contact with the object which interests it is necessary to produce the stimulation, and that reaction can then hardly be delayed. Thus, in the lower organisms, touch is active and passive at one and the same time, enabling them to recognize their prey and seize it, to feel a danger and make the effort to avoid it. The various prolongations of the protozoa, the ambulacra of the echinodermata, are organs of movement as well as of tactile perception; the stinging apparatus of the coelenterata is an instrument of perception as well as a means of defence. In a word, the more immediate the reaction is compelled to be, the more must perception resemble a mere contact; and the complete process of perception and of reaction can then hardly be distinguished from a mechanical impulsion followed by a necessary movement. But in the measure that the reaction becomes more uncertain, and allows more room for suspense, does the distance increase at which the anima is sensible of the action of that which interests it. By sight, by hearing, it enters into relation with an (pg 23) ever greater number of things, and is subject to more and more distant influences; and, whether these objects promise an advantage or threaten a danger, both promises and threats defer the date of their fulfilment. The degree of independence of which a living being is master, or, as we shall say, the zone of indetermination which surrounds its activity, allows, then, of an a priori estimate of the number and the distance of the things with which it is in relation. Whatever this relation may be, whatever be the inner nature of perception, we can affirm that its amplitude gives the exact measure of the indetermination of the act which is to follow. So that we can formulate this law: perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time.

정리
- 우선은, 엄밀한 법칙에 의해서, 의식적 지각의 범위가 생명체가 처리하는 행동의 강도에 연결된다는 사실에 주목하자.
- 하등한 종들에서의 경우 지각은 '단순한 접촉'을 닮고 있으며, 그들의 '지각과 반응'은 필연적 운동을 따르는 기계적 충동의 모습을 닮아 있다. (즉 정리하자면 그것들의 감각 기관은 매우 단순한 형태를 취하고 있으며, 그것들의 반응은 거의 대부분 기계적으로, 필연적으로 이루어진다는 것. 이를테면 찌르면 움츠러드는 식으로)
- 그러나 반응이 더욱 불확실하게 되고, 지연이 생길수록, 차츰 동물의 관심을 끄는 대상의 작용이 그에게 느껴지는 거리도 역시 증가한다. 즉 시각, 청각에 의해 동물은 더 많은 사물들과 관계를 맺으며, 동시에 점점 더 멀리 떨어져 있는 영향을 받게 된다.
- 생명체의 활동을 둘러싸고 있는 비결정성의 지대는, 생명체가 관계하는 사물들의 수와 거리를 선험적으로 평가하게 해 준다. (나의 해석 : 경험 이전에 측정할 수 있게 해준다)
- (따라서 지각의 폭(정도)가 증가하면 행동의 비결정성도 증가한다.)
- '행동이 시간을 처리하는 정도' 과 '지각이 공간을 처리하는 정도'의 크기는 정확히 정비례한다. (즉 '행동이 시간을 처리하는 정도가 증가 = 비결정성, 지연, 머뭇거림이 증가'한다는 것이고 '지각이 공간을 처리하는 정도가 증가 = 감각기관이 대상으로부터 더 멀리 떨어져 있는 영향을 받는다'라는 뜻인 듯)

 

Mais pourquoi ce rapport de l'organisme à des objets plus ou moins lointains prend-il la forme particulière d'une perception consciente ? Nous avons examiné ce qui se passe dans le corps organisé ; nous avons vu des mouvements transmis ou inhibés, métamorphosés en actions accomplies ou éparpillés en actions naissantes. Ces mouvements nous ont paru intéresser l'action, et l'action seulement ; ils restent absolument étrangers au processus de la représentation. Nous avons considéré alors l'action elle-même et l'indé- termination qui l'environne, indétermination qui est impliquée dans la structure du système nerveux, et en vue de laquelle ce système paraît avoir été construit bien plutôt qu'en vue de la représentation. De cette indétermination, acceptée comme un fait, nous avons pu conclure à la nécessité d'une percep- tion, c'est-à-dire d'une relation variable entre l'être vivant et les influences plus ou moins lointaines des objets qui l'intéressent. D'où vient que cette percep- tion est conscience, et pourquoi tout se passe-t-il comme si cette conscience naissait des mouvements intérieurs de la substance cérébrale ?

But why does this relation of the organism to more or less distant objects take the particular form of conscious perception? We have examined what takes place in the organized body, we have seen movements transmitted or inhibited, metamorphosed into accomplished actions or broken up into nascent actions. These movements appear to us to concern action, and action alone; they remain absolutely foreign to the process of representation. We then considered action itself, and the indetermination which surrounds it and is implied in the structure of the nervous system, - an indetermination to which this system seems to point much more than to representation. (pg 24) From this indetermination, accepted as a fact, we have been able to infer the necessity of a perception, that is to say, of a variable relation between the living being and the more or less distant influence of the objects which interest it. How is it that this perception is consciousness, and why does everything happen as if this consciousness were born of the internal movements of the cerebral substance?

정리
- 그러나 유기체가 다소간 멀리 있는 대상들에 대해 가지는 이러한 관계는 왜 '의식적 지각'이라는 특별한 형태를 취하는가?
- 우리는 지금까지, 운동들이 (뇌수로) 전달되거나 억제되어, 완성된 행동들로 변형되거나 시발적 행동들로 펼쳐지는 것을 보았다. 이 운동은 우리에게는 행동에, 오직 행동에만 관련되는 것처럼 보였다. 그것들은 아직 표상의 형성 과정과는 아주 다른 것처럼 남아 있다.
- 또한 우리가 살펴본 바에 의하면, 신경계란 표상을 위해서라기보다는 비결정성을 위해 구성된 것처럼 보인다.
- 그리고 우리는 하나의 사실로서 받아들여진 이 비결정성으로부터 지각의 필연성, 즉 '생명체'와 ' 대상들의 다소 멀리 떨어진 영향들' 사이에 있는 변화 가능한 관계의 필연성을 결과로 이끌어낼 수 있었다.
- 그런데 이 지각이 의식이라는 사실은 어디서 유래하며, 이 의식이라는 것이 마치 뇌수질의 내적인 운동들로부터 생겨나는 것처럼 보이는 이유는 무엇인가?