[물질과 기억 독해] 63~71

Pour répondre à cette question, nous allons d'abord simplifier beaucoup les conditions où la perception consciente s'accomplit. En fait, il n'y a pas de perception qui ne soit imprégnée de souvenirs. Aux données immédiates et présentes de nos sens nous mêlons mille et mille détails de notre expérience passée. Le plus souvent, ces souvenirs déplacent nos perceptions réelles, dont nous ne retenons alors que quelques indications, simples « signes » destinés à nous rappeler d'anciennes images. La commodité et la rapidité de la percep- tion sont à ce prix ; mais de là naissent aussi les illusions de tout genre. Rien n'empêche de substituer à cette perception, toute pénétrée de notre passé, la perception qu'aurait une conscience adulte et formée, mais enfermée dans le présent, et absorbée, à l'exclusion de tout autre travail, dans la tâche de se mouler sur l'objet extérieur. Dira-t-on que nous faisons une hypothèse arbitraire, et que cette perception idéale, obtenue par l'élimination des acci- dents individuels, ne répond plus du tout à la réalité ? Mais nous espérons précisément montrer que les accidents individuels sont greffés sur cette perception impersonnelle, que cette perception est à la base même de notre connaissance des choses, et que c'est pour l'avoir méconnue, pour ne pas l'avoir distinguée de ce que la mémoire y ajoute ou en retranche, qu'on a fait de la perception tout entière une espèce de vision intérieure et subjective, qui ne différerait du souvenir que par sa plus grande intensité. Telle sera donc notre première hypothèse. Mais elle en entraîne naturellement une autre. Si courte qu'on suppose une perception, en effet, elle occupe toujours une certai- ne durée, et exige par conséquent un effort de la mémoire, qui prolonge les uns dans les autres une pluralité de moments. Même, comme nous essaierons de le montrer, la « subjectivité » des qualités sensibles consiste surtout dans une espèce de contraction du réel, opérée par notre mémoire. Bref, la mémoire sous ces deux formes, en tant qu'elle recouvre d'une nappe de souvenirs un fond de perception immédiate et en tant aussi qu'elle contracte une multiplicité de moments, constitue le principal apport de la conscience individuelle dans la perception, le côté subjectif de notre connaissance des choses ; et en négli- geant cet apport pour rendre notre idée plus claire, nous allons nous avancer beaucoup plus loin qu'il ne convient sur la voie où nous nous sommes engagés. Nous en serons quittes pour revenir ensuite sur nos pas, et pour corriger, par la réintégration surtout de la mémoire, ce que nos conclusions pourraient avoir d'excessif. Il ne faut donc voir dans ce qui va suivre qu'un exposé schématique, et nous demanderons qu'on entende provisoirement par perception non pas ma perception concrète et complexe, celle que gonflent mes souvenirs et qui offre toujours une certaine épaisseur de durée, mais la perception pure, une perception qui existe en droit plutôt qu'en fait, celle qu'aurait un être placé où je suis, vivant comme je vis, mais absorbé dans le présent, et capable, par l'élimination de la mémoire sous toutes ses formes, d'obtenir de la matière une vision à la fois immédiate et instantanée. Plaçons- nous donc dans cette hypothèse, et demandons-nous comment la perception consciente s'explique.

To answer this question, we will first simplify considerably the conditions under which conscious perception takes place. In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past experience. In most cases these memories supplant our actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a few hints, thus using them merely as 'signs' that recall to us former images. The convenience and the rapidity of perception are bought at this price; but hence also springs every kind of illusion. Let us, for the purposes of study, substitute for this perception, impregnated with our past, a perception that a consciousness would have if it were supposed to be ripe and full-grown, yet confined to the present and absorbed, to the exclusion of all else, in the task of moulding itself upon the external object. - It may be urged that this is an arbitrary hypothesis, and that such an ideal perception, obtained by the (pg 25) elimination of individual accidents, has no correspondence with reality. - But we hope to show that the individual accidents are merely grafted on to this impersonal perception, which is at the very root of our knowledge of things; and that just because philosophers have overlooked it, because they have not distinguished it from that which memory adds to or subtracts from it, they have taken perception as a whole for a kind of interior and subjective vision, which would then differ from memory only by its greater intensity. This will be our first hypothesis. But it leads naturally to another. However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and involves consequently an effort of memory which prolongs one into another a plurality of moments. As we shall endeavour to show, even the 'subjectivity' of sensible qualities consists above all else in a kind of contraction of the real, effected by our memory. In short, memory in these two forms, covering as it does with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perception, and also contracting a number of external moments into a single internal moment, constitutes the principal share of individual consciousness in perception, the subjective side of the knowledge of things; and, since we must neglect this share in order to make our idea clearer, we shall go too far along the path we have chosen. But we shall only have to retrace our steps and to correct, especially by bringing memory (pg 26) back again, whatever may be excessive in our conclusions. What follows, therefore, must be regarded as only a schematic rendering, and we ask that perception should be provisionally understood to mean not my concrete and complex perception - that which is enlarged by memories and offers always a certain breadth of duration - but a Pure perception, I mean a perception which exists in theory rather than in fact and would be possessed by a being placed where I am, living as I live, but absorbed in the present and capable, by giving up every form of memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous. Adopting this hypothesis, let us consider how conscious perception may be explained.

정리
- 기억들Souvenirs로 배어 있지 않은 지각은 없다. 즉 모든 지각은 언제나 기억과 연관되어 있다.
- 이 기억들은 종종 우리의 실제적 지각들을 바꾸어 놓는다. 우리는 실제적 지각으로부터 단순한 신호들<signes>만을 붙잡는다. 이 신호들은 우리가 과거의 이미지들을 상기하도록 한다. 이 신호들로 인해 우리는 지각의 신속성을 얻게 된다.
- 우리의 인식의 기초에는 '비개인적 지각=이상적인 지각=현재 속에 갇혀서 모든 다른 일들을 배제하고 외적 대상을 본뜨는 일에만 몰두하는 지각'이 놓여 있다.
- 우리는 이 '비개인적 지각'과 '기억이 비개인적 지각에 덧붙인 것'을 구별할 줄 알아야 한다.
- 또 기억이 이만큼 중요하기 때문에, 우리는 이렇게 말할 수 있다. 하나의 지각을 아무리 짧다고 가정하더라도, 그것은 항상 일정한 지속을 점유하고, 따라서 무수한 순간들을 서로서로의 안으로 연장하는 기억작용memoire의 노력을 요구한다. [*왠지 Souvenirs는 memoire 보다 더 개인적인 기억을 의미하는 거고 memoire은 보편적인 기억을 의미하는 듯]
- 또 앞으로 보여주겠지만, 감각적 성질들의 <주관성>이라는 것도 실재에 대해 우리 기억memoire이 가한 일종의 응축contraction으로 이루어진다.
- 즉, 기억memoire은 사물에 대한 우리 인식의 주관적인 측면을 구성한다.
- 이 기억memoire은 직접적 지각이라는 바닥을 기억들souvenirs의 담요로 덮고 있는 것이다. [*즉 직접적 지각+souvenirs = memoire(응축하는 기능을 함) -> 우리 인식의 주관적 측면을 구성]
- 우리는 일단 이 주관적 측며면을 무시하고 연구를 진행한 다음, 다시 기억memoire을 회복시킴으로써 우리의 결론들이 가지고 있을지 모르는 지나친 점을 수정할 것이다.
- 잠정적으로 '순수한 지각'에 대해 생각해보자. 이것은 : '나의 기억들이 부풀리는, 그래서 일정한 두께의 지속을 제공하는 지각이 아닌 지각, 사실적이라기보다는 권리적으로 존재하는 지각, 현재 속에 매몰된 지각, 모든 형태의 기억을 배제시킴으로써 물질로부터 직접적이면서 동시에 순간적인 영상을 얻을 수 있는 존재가 가질지도 모르는 지각'이다.
- 그리고 이 순수한 지각으로부터 의식적 지각을 설명해보도록 하자.

 

Déduire la conscience serait une entreprise bien hardie, mais elle n'est vraiment pas nécessaire ici, parce qu'en posant le monde matériel on s'est donné un ensemble d'images, et qu'il est d'ailleurs impossible de se donner autre chose. Aucune théorie de la matière n'échappe à cette nécessité. Réduis- ez la matière à des atomes en mouvement : ces atomes, même dépourvus de qualités physiques, ne se déterminent pourtant que par rapport à une vision et à un contact possibles, celle-là sans éclairage et celui-ci sans matérialité. Condensez l'atome en centres de force, dissolvez-le en tourbillons évoluant dans un fluide continu : ce fluide, ces mouvements, ces centres ne se détermi- nent eux-mêmes que par rapport à un toucher impuissant, à une impulsion inefficace, à une lumière décolorée ; ce sont des images encore. Il est vrai qu'une image peut être sans être perçue ; elle peut être présente sans être représentée ; et la distance entre ces deux termes, présence et représentation, paraît justement mesurer l'intervalle entre la matière elle-même et la percep- tion consciente que nous en avons. Mais examinons ces choses de plus près et voyons en quoi consiste au juste cette différence. S'il y avait plus dans le second terme que dans le premier, si, pour passer de la présence à la représen- tation, il fallait ajouter quelque chose, la distance serait infranchissable, et le passage de la matière à la perception resterait enveloppé d'un impénétrable mystère. Il n'en serait pas de même si l'on pouvait passer du premier terme au second par voie de diminution, et si la représentation d'une image était moins que sa seule présence ; car alors il suffirait que les images présentes fussent forcées d'abandonner quelque chose d'elles-mêmes pour que leur simple présence les convertît en représentations. Or, voici l'image que j'appelle un objet matériel ; j'en ai la représentation. D'où vient qu'elle ne paraît pas être en soi ce qu'elle est pour moi ? C'est que, solidaire de la totalité des autres images, elle se continue dans celles qui la suivent comme elle prolongeait celles qui la précèdent. Pour transformer son existence pure et simple en représentation, il suffirait de supprimer tout d'un coup ce qui la suit, ce qui la précède, et aussi ce qui la remplit, de n'en plus conserver que la croûte extérieure, la pellicule superficielle. Ce qui la distingue, elle image présente, elle réalité objective, d'une image représentée, c'est la nécessité où elle est d'agir par chacun de ses points sur tous les points des autres images, de transmettre la totalité de ce qu'elle reçoit, d'opposer à chaque action une réaction égale et contraire, de n'être enfin qu'un chemin sur lequel passent en tous sens les modifications qui se propagent dans l'immensité de l'univers.

To deduce consciousness would be, indeed, a bold undertaking; but it is really not necessary here, because by positing the material world we assume an aggregate of images, and moreover because it is impossible to assume anything else. No theory of matter escapes this necessity. Reduce matter to atoms in motion: these atoms, though denuded of physical qualities, are determined only in relation to an eventual vision and an eventual contact, the one without light and the other without materiality. Condense atoms into centres of force, dissolve them into vortices revolving in a continuous fluid: this fluid, these movements, these centres, can themselves be determined only in relation to an (pg 27) impotent touch, an ineffectual impulsion, a colourless light; they are still images. It is true that an image may be without being perceived; it may be present without being represented; and the distance between these two terms, presence and representation, seems just to measure the interval between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter. But let us examine the point more closely, and see in what this difference consists. If there were more in the second term than in the first, if, in order to pass from presence to representation, it were necessary to add something, the barrier would indeed be insuperable, and the passage from matter to perception would remain wrapt in impenetrable mystery. It would not be the same if it were possible to pass from the first term to the second by way of diminution, and if the representation of an image were less than its presence; for it would then suffice that the images present should be compelled to abandon something of themselves in order that their mere presence should convert them into representations. Now, here is the image which I call a material object; I have the representation of it. How comes it that it does not appear to be in itself that which it is for me? It is because, being bound up with all other images, it is continued in those which follow it, just as it prolonged those which preceded it. To transform its existence into representation, it would be enough to suppress what follows it, what precedes it, and also all that fills it, and to (pg 28) retain only its external crust, its superficial skin. That which distinguishes it as a present image, as an objective reality, from a represented image is the necessity which obliges it to act through every one of its points upon all the points of all other images, to transmit the whole of what it receives, to oppose to every action an equal and contrary reaction, to be, in short, merely a road by which pass, in every direction, the modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the universe.

정리
- 이미지들은 실제로 지각되지 않고도 있을 수 있다. 즉 그것은 표상되지 않고도 현존할 수 있다.
- 집합관계로 봤을 때 <현존presence>가 <표상>보다 더 크다. 즉 표상은 현존에서 뭔가를 덜어냄으로써 생긴다.
- 표상이 아닌, 물질적 대상 그 자체의 이미지는 다른 이미지들 전체와 연대적이어서, 자신을 앞서는 이미지들을 연장하는prolonger 동시에 자신을 뒤따르는 이미지들 속에서 연속된다.
- 이 이미지의 순수하고 단순한 실존 existence를 표상으로 변형하기 위해서는, 자신을 뒤따르는 것과 앞서는 것, 그리고 또한 자신을 가득 채우고 있는 것을 단번에 제거하고, 그것의 외피 즉 표면의 얇은 막만을 보존하는 것으로 충분하다.
- 현존하는 이미지는 필연성 속에 놓여 있다. (*작용 반작용의 필연성인 듯)
- 용어 설명 : '현존하는 이미지 = 객관적 실재성 = 물질 자체의 이미지'

 

Je la convertirais en représentation si je pouvais l'isoler, si surtout je pouvais en isoler l'enveloppe. La représentation est bien là, mais toujours virtuelle, neutralisée, au moment où elle passerait à l'acte, par l'obligation de se conti- nuer et de se perdre en autre chose. Ce qu'il faut pour obtenir cette conversion, ce n'est pas éclairer l'objet, mais au contraire en obscurcir certains côtés, le diminuer de la plus grande partie de lui-même, de manière que le résidu, au lieu de demeurer emboîté dans l'entourage comme une chose, s'en détache comme un tableau. Or, si les êtres vivants constituent dans l'univers des « centres d'indétermination », et si le degré de cette indétermination se mesure au nombre et à l'élévation de leurs fonctions, on conçoit que leur seule pré- sence puisse équivaloir à la suppression de toutes les parties des objets auxquelles leurs fonctions ne sont pas intéressées. Ils se laisseront traverser, en quelque sorte, par celles d'entre les actions extérieures qui leur sont indiffé- rentes ; les autres, isolées, deviendront « perceptions » par leur isolement même. Tout se passera alors pour nous comme si nous réfléchissions sur les surfaces la lumière qui en émane, lumière qui, se propageant toujours, n'eût jamais été révélée. Les images qui nous environnent paraîtront tourner vers notre corps, mais éclairée cette fois, la face qui l'intéresse; elles détacheront de leur substance ce que nous aurons arrêté au passage, ce que nous sommes capables d'influencer. Indifférentes les unes aux autres en raison du méca- nisme radical qui les lie, elles se présentent réciproquement les unes aux autres toutes leurs faces à la fois, ce qui revient à dire qu'elles agissent et réagissent entre elles par toutes leurs parties élémentaires, et qu'aucune d'elles, par conséquent, n'est perçue ni ne perçoit consciemment. Que si, au contraire, elles se heurtent quelque part à une certaine spontanéité de réaction, leur action est diminuée d'autant, et cette diminution de leur action est justement la représentation que nous avons d'elles. Notre représentation des choses naîtrait donc, en somme, de ce qu'elles viennent se réfléchir contre notre liberté.

I should convert it into representation if I could isolate it, especially if I could isolate its shell. Representation is there, but always virtual-being neutralized, at the very moment when it might become actual, by the obligation to continue itself and to lose itself in something else. To obtain this conversion from the virtual to the actual it would be necessary, not to throw more light on the object, but on the contrary to obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings as a thing, should detach itself from them as a picture. Now if living beings are, within the universe, just 'centres of indetermination,' and if the degree of this indetermination is measured by the number and rank of their functions, we can conceive that their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of objects in which their functions find no interest. They allow to pass through them, so to speak, those external influences which are indifferent to them; the others (pg 29) isolated, become 'perceptions' by their very isolation. Everything thus happens for us as though we reflected back to surfaces the light which emanates from them, the light which, had it passed on unopposed, would never have been revealed. The images which surround us will appear to turn towards our body the side, emphasized by the light upon it, which interests our body. They will detach from themselves that which we have arrested on its way, that which we are capable of influencing. Indifferent to each other because of the radical mechanism which binds them together, they present each to the others all their sides at once: which means that they act and react mutually by all their elements, and that none of them perceives or is perceived consciously. Suppose, on the contrary, that they encounter somewhere a certain spontaneity of reaction: their action is so far diminished, and this diminution of their action is just the representation which we have of them. Our representation of things would thus arise from the fact that they are thrown back and reflected by our freedom.

정리
- 표상이 일어나기 위해서 필요한 것은 대상을 조명하는 것이 아니라, 반대로 대상의 어떤 측면들을 모호하게 하고, 대상으로부터 가장 커다란 부분을 감소시킴으로써, 그 나머지가(*떨어져 나온 것인 듯) 주변 속에 하나의 사물처럼 끼워 넣어져 있는 것이 아니라, 하나의 그림처럼 그것으로부터 분리되도록 하는 것이다.
- '생명체들의 현존 자체 = 자신들의 기능들이 관련되지 않은 대상들의 모든 부분을 제거하는 것' 이라는 등가식이 가능하다.
- 생명체들은 자신들에게 무관한 외적 작용들 중 어떤 것들로 하여금 스스로를 통과하게 하며, 다른 작용들은 고립되어 그들의 고립 자체에 의해 <지각>이 될 것이다.
- 우리 생명체에게 일어나는 일은 이런 식으로 비유할 수 있다 : 우리에게는 모든 일이 우리가 대상의 표면들 위에다 그것으로부터 나온 빛, 즉 계속 퍼져나가면서 결코 드러난 적이 없었던 빛을 반사하는 것처럼 일어난다.
- 우리를 둘러싸고 있는 이미지들 (*물질 자체로서의 이미지를 말하는 듯) 은 자신들을 연결하는 철저한 기계적 과정 때문에 서로에게 무관심하다. 또한 그들은 서로에게 자신들의 모든 측면들을 동시에 제시한다. 즉 그들은 그들 자신의 모든 요소적인 부분들에 의해 서로 작용, 반작용하기 때문에 그것들 중의 어떤 것도 의식적으로 지각되지 않는다. (*즉 '모든 부분'에 있어 작용 반작용 하기 때문에 즉, 필터링이 안돼서 지각이라는 게 안일어난다는 뜻인 듯)
- 그런데 만일 이 이미지들이 어디선가 어떤 자발성, 즉 반작용하는 어떤 것에 부딪친다면, 그것들의 작용은 그만큼 줄어든다. 이 '작용의 감소'가 바로 우리가 그것들에 대해 가지는 표상이다. 따라서 사물들에 대한 우리의 표상은 말하자면 그것이 우리의 자유에 부딪쳐 반사된다는 사실로부터 생겨난다.

Quand un rayon de lumière passe d'un milieu dans un autre, il le traverse généralement en changeant de direction. Mais telles peuvent être les densités respectives des deux milieux que, pour un certain angle d'incidence, il n'y ait plus de réfraction possible. Alors se produit la réflexion totale. Il se forme du point lumineux une image virtuelle, qui symbolise, en quelque sorte, l'impos- sibilité où sont les rayons lumineux de poursuivre leur chemin. La perception est un phénomène du même genre. Ce qui est donné, c'est la totalité des images du monde matériel avec la totalité de leurs éléments intérieurs. Mais si vous supposez des centres d'activité véritable, c'est-à-dire spontanée, les rayons qui y parviennent et qui intéresseraient cette activité, au lieu de les traverser, paraîtront revenir dessiner les contours de l'objet qui les envoie. Il n'y aura rien là de positif, rien qui s'ajoute à l'image, rien de nouveau. Les objets ne feront qu'abandonner quelque chose de leur action réelle pour figurer ainsi leur action virtuelle, c'est-à-dire, au fond, l'influence possible de l'être vivant sur eux. La perception ressemble donc bien à ces phénomènes de réflexion qui viennent d'une réfraction empêchée; c'est comme un effet de mirage.

When a ray of light passes from one medium into another, it usually traverses it with a change of direction. But the respective densities of the two media may be such that, for a given angle of incidence, refraction is no longer possible. Then we have total reflexion. The luminous point gives rise to a virtual image which symbolizes, so to speak, the fact that the luminous (pg 30) rays cannot pursue their way. Perception is just a phenomenon of the same kind. That which is given is the totality of the images of the material world, with the totality of their internal elements. But if we suppose centres of real, that is to say of spontaneous, activity, the rays which reach it, and which interest that activity, instead of passing through those centres, will appear to be reflected and thus to indicate the outlines of the object which emits them. There is nothing positive here, nothing added to the image, nothing new. The objects merely abandon something of their real action in order to manifest their virtual action - that is to say, in the main, the eventual influence of the living being upon them. Perception therefore resembles those phenomena of reflexion which result from an impeded refraction; it is like an effect of mirage.

정리
- 지각은 이를테면 전반사 현상과 유사한 것이다.
- 만일 물질적 세계의 이미지들 안에서 자발적인 활동성의 중심들을 가정한다면, 이 활동성의 관심을 끄는 광선들은 이 중심들을 통과하는 대신에 그것들을 보낸 대상의 윤곽들을 그리러 되돌아오는 것처럼 보인다. 거기에는 적극적인 것이라고는 없으며, 이미지에 덧붙여지는 것도, 새로운 것도 없다.